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BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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Editorial Page

The 45 nonaligned nations in the UN, together have the voting strength to determine the outcome of issues before the Assembly of that body. It is within their power, and is, therefore, their responsibility, to decide whether UN action solves national and regional problems affecting the peace of the world, or whether that body allows critical international issues to drift and the world to face destruction by failure to take resolute action. The response of nonaligned nations to world problems has been seen in one instance at the Belgrade Conference. Many of the most critical issues of the world are now on the UNGA agenda. The President has expressed himself clearly on these issues and on the responsibility of all UN member nations. (See Press Comment 26 September 1961 for text of President Kennedy's address to the UNGA on 25 September 1961).

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Briefly Noted

1. Communist Networks in Latin America Organizing Subversive Warfare: On 13 September, the Panama City radio reported that, for the past three months, in almost all of the Latin American countries, instructions have been issued to include guerrilla warfare among the subjects to be studied by their armed forces. The reason for this has been that communist networks have been discovered which attempt to create uprisings everywhere. Proof exists that foreign elements were in contact with terrorist and subversive elements. The countries most affected by this campaign are in the Caribbean area; they are maintaining themselves alert against any surprise from foreign subversive elements, presumably Castroite.

2. Moscow Radio Warns Against Dangers of Democracy and Free Elections: In his commentary in the Moscow radio domestic service in Russian on 14 September 1961, Ruslan Tuchmin claims that following the assassination of the Dominican dictator Trujillo, the United States "concluded that the time had come to interfere directly in that country's internal affairs". He then indicates that the "notorious" OAS commission, headed by U.S. Representative Morrison, was established at this time. Tuchmin goes on to say that "order, in the eyes of the American bosses, entails stirring up the people with talk of democracy, organizing free elections under Washington's strict tutelage, by force if necessary, to put their own people in Power." It is obvious that the Soviets are at a loss to take a clear-cut stand regarding the delicate situation presently existing in the Dominican Republic. The best they could do, apparently, aside from approving stormy demonstrations by the people against reactionary regimes was to accuse the U. S. of some kind of interference. It is to be doubted that they would want references such as these to democracy and free elections, to be heard elsewhere than in Soviet Russia itself where people probably have no further illusions concerning the true communist attitude toward these two cornerstones of the free world.

3. On 1 September in Moscow an agricultural aid agreement was signed between the USSR and Ghana under which, besides other forms of agricultural assistance, the Soviet Union will provide specialists to set up state farms for the cultivation of corn and rice and experimental cotton growth. The horrible experiences of Communist countries in agriculture, notably those of Communist China but not excluding the Soviet Union, have evidently not been sufficiently noted or have been disregarded by the Ghanaians.

4. The Troika Issue: As is by now well known, the USSR is insisting as a condition precedent to discussion of substantive issues - e.g. election of replacement for the UN Secretary-General, establishment of a control commission to supervise nuclear weapons testing, and establishment of a Laotian Control Commission - that the West agree to a three-unit body, representing the West, the Communists and the Neutrals, with unanimous agreement required for action. This we oppose, as do many Western and uncommitted nations. In handling our

Briefly Noted (cont.)

opposition, however, care should be taken to distinguish between our objection to a three-headed rule in these cases and our continued insistence upon the Great Power veto requirement in the Security Council. The United States has always considered, in the legislative or policy field, the requirement of unanimity of the Great Powers essential for the protection of their interests. In the executive or administrative field, this country has traditionally favored a strong and independent body, led by a single head. The orders, the instructions, the policy - the "law" as it were - are promulgated by a parliamentary body in which every member state is entitled both to argue its case and to be protected against arbitrary action by such parliamentary devices as the requirement of a two-thirds majority on "important" questions, (as in the General Assembly) or a requirement of unanimity in certain cases (as in the Security Council). Once, however, policy has been settled or instructions issued, executive action requires effective machinery which will permit speedy and impartial execution. Application of the so-called Troika principle to the UN Secretariat, to the Nuclear Testing Control Commission or to the Laotian Control Commission would negate effective action by permitting the interposition of partisan objections to what should be impartial action - the precise aim of the USSR. (See State Circular #556 dated 23 September 1961 to All American Diplomatic Posts, elaborating on principle and extending to include the deputy level of the SYG).

431. COMMUNIST CHINA: Food, Disease, and the Decline of "People's Morale".

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Background: There is a substantial body of evidence revealing the existence of widespread psychological depression and cynicism among the population of mainland China. To date this growing disillusionment has generally not taken the form of open anti-regime activity, but is characterized by petty infractions of the law, open grumbling, and indifference to authority. Visitors to the mainland report a recent upsurge of theft, balckmarketeeing, and begging. The attitudes and actions which foreign observers report contrast sharply with the behavior which the communists have tried to impose on the population. Public controls were partially relaxed last fall, presumably because the authorities decided to allow the populace some safety valve to the growing resentment over the regime's failure to provide the better economic and social life promised them at the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward" program in 1958. One recent visitor to Canton, Shanghai and Peiping said he saw gambling on the streets, people throwing refuse out of bus and train windows, spitting, couples holding hands, and open begging. Two years ago behavior of this sort was never in evidence. Travelers report extreme shortages of basic consumer necessities such as cloth and soap. Refugees state that these hardships have produced a growing preoccupation with personal affairs, increased selfishness, and conversations concentrated almost exclusively on food. Official complaints about the need to "generate revolutionary enthusiasm among the masses" indicate that Peiping is aware of the situation.

At the heart of China's morale problems are food shortages and the regime's failure to devise some workable agricultural production program. While it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the scope of present food shortages, we continue to receive reports to the effect that: stealing food is no longer treated as a serious crime; work stoppages in factories--the bulk of the employees being absent due to illness--are directly attributable to malnutrition; and near starvation levels pertain in some areas. One of the innovations of the "Great Leap Forward" program was the rapid development and enforcement of communes, and the complete centralization of control over farm production. The commune program bogged down almost immediately and since mid-1959 there has been a steady retreat from the system which was heralded as the answer to China's food problems. Three successive years of drought and flood have greatly impeded the regime's efforts to increase food production; however, these three years of "trial and error" in implementing the commune system have resulted in highly inefficient and mismanaged crop production. As initially conceived, the direction of administrative and operational control would flow from the basic production unit, the commune, to the production brigade, and finally reach the smallest unit of the system, the production team for implementation. In mid-1959 the production brigade supplanted the commune as the basic farm unit. By late 1960 major responsibilities were transferred from the production brigade to

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production teams in a further decentralization of control precipitated by peasant grumbling and failure of the system to increase production. Current reports indicate that a further fragmentation of control is being implemented. In some areas production teams are being broken into smaller units and given control of land, tools, and draft animals. The regime, nevertheless, as if reluctant to admit to the peasants that the commune system has failed, continues to talk about communes and at the same time to lecture commune and brigade cadres on the fact that they are in many respects subordinate to production teams. A Peiping People's Daily editorial of 8 September 1961 titled "A Good Job in Sowing This Autumn Will Bring About a Good Harvest Next Summer" noted that "the most basic requirement is to fully utilize the enthusiasm of the broad masses of commune members" and went on to state:

"In the formulation of autumn sowing plans communes and production brigades must positively emphasize the right of self-determination of the production teams. The production team is a unit in the commune which actually organizes production, and the cadres and members of the team are most familiar with the climate, soil conditions, irrigation, fertilizer, and so forth of the locality. They also understand best the lessons of production failures and successes in the locality during past years. Therefore, the production team must have the right of determination, and its members must be allowed to discuss and determine the important autumn sowing measures of the team before autumn sowing can really be conducted in accordance with local conditions."


And then in a masterpiece of double-talk the editorial tells the communes and brigades to continue their "paperwork" but not to get in the way of the production teams:

"In the formulation of autumn sowing plans communes and production brigades may present their preliminary requirements to the production teams on the basis of the national plan and of the actual conditions of the teams. However, the production brigade's autumn sowing plans must be based upon the autumn sowing plans of its production teams."

Another facet of the mainland China scene which contributes to a lowering morale and loss of revolutionary zeal is the regime's failure to cope adequately with health and sanitation problems. Cholera has reached epidemic proportions in the southern province of Kwangtung. Tuberculosis and bacillary dysentery are reliably reported to have increased in other areas of the Chinese mainland. This public health crisis is caused primarily by food shortages over the past two years which have lowered resistance to disease. A contributing factor has been an acute shortage of medicine. The Chinese Communists have reacted with extreme sensitivity to foreign reports of the cholera epidemic. They ignored these accounts at first and then began publishing references to the outbreak in Hong Kong and Macao, stating that they were taking precautions to

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keep the epidemic from spreading to the mainland. Actually the first case of cholera did not appear in Macao until 12 August or in Hong Kong until 16 August, a month after it was well established that the epidemic had broken out in the rural areas of Kwangtung Province. On 29 August Peiping announced it had recently discovered cases of "para-cholera" in Kwangtung. Finally on 3 September in a cable to the International Red Cross, Peiping admitted that a cholera outbreak had occurred, but asserted the disease was under control.



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432. The True Status of Soviet Science

perspective.

Background: The flights of Gagarin and Titov and the proposed explosion of a 100 megaton bomb have again focused attention on Soviet science. These developments will contribute, with some reason, to a belief in Soviet military might. Our best response on this level is to point to US capabilities, as suggested in Guidance #365 of 27 March, "The Nuclear Submarine - An American Technical Triumph". But there is another level of Soviet science propaganda. Science, is, in a sense, the intellectual frontier of mankind, and Soviet science supposedly proves that the USSR represents the "wave of the future". But to make this plausible, Soviet science as a whole (and not merely the field of rocketry) would have to be superior to that of the free world. Such is not the case.

In the field of advanced science, on the real frontier of knowledge, Soviet scientists have not shown, and are not likely to show, any superiority. True, there are certain first class Soviet scientists, such as V. V. Belousov, A. A. Blagonravov, L. D. Landau, and N. N. Bogolyubov, just as there were first-class Russian scientists in Czarist days. From 1937 to date, however, the US has won 15 Nobel prizes in physics against 3 for the Soviets, 9 in chemistry to the Soviet 2 (one actually a Czech), and 21 in medicine and physiology to the Soviet zero. In addition, other Nobel prize winners in the free world, namely British and German, have since 1937 won a total of 27 prizes in these same fields, distributed as follows: physics - 6 British and 1 German; chemistry - 7 British and 6 German; and medicine/physiology - 4 British and 3 German. A number of the British and American Nobel Prize winners have been naturalized nationals, born in continental Europe, especially Germany (2 of the Anglo-American winners of prizes in physics, 7 of the winners of prizes in medicine/physiology, one of whom, Selman Waksman, was a native of the Ukraine); they preferred not to work under totalitarian control.

Soviet "Research Institutes" are multiplying very rapidly (personnel has increased nearly 50% since 1956) but the number of holders of advanced degrees rises only slowly (approximately 1/6 since 1956); it takes time to train a really advanced scientist and many of those who should be giving or receiving the training are busy in the new institutes or with production. Soviet theoretical physicists are strong in mathematics but not so strong on physical intuition, insight, or laboratory experience. And physics, with its military applicability, is a favored field (the contrast in Nobel prizes between physics and medicine/physiology reflects the fact that the Soviet regime is more interested in ruling--and if necessary, killing--people than in curing them). One may doubt whether Soviet society will ever produce scientists of the stature of Einstein; really great scientists are prepared to question all preconceptions. Although the USSR permits more freedom of discussion in science than in other fields, the nature of Soviet society does not encourage the essential habit of free criticism.

Obviously, many Soviet research institutes really belong on the lower levels of science or of technology. The number of new institutes is impressive, but many of these are comparable to the research and design facilities of

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Western private industry. Similarly, it is claimed that 105,000 Soviet engineers graduate annually, compared with 35,000 in the US. But in the USSR, "engineer" diplomas are given to food technologists, agronomists, animal husbandrymen, etc. A Soviet broadcast recently boasted of a school enrollment of 33.3 million, and claimed that 5 million American children did not attend school. The US Bureau of Census figures show that, with a smaller population, 41 million American children attended kindergarten, elementary school and high school in 1959; the same source shows two million not in school between the ages of 5 and 17 inclusive. 1959-60 enrollment in Soviet higher educational institutions was 2,200,000. Comparable enrollment in the US was 3,402,297.

The day of the false Soviet invention claim is not yet over. The Soviets try to present themselves in many areas as inventors of oral polio vaccine. In actual fact, they use one of the three oral vaccines developed by Americans, the Sabin strain. They got it from Sabin, who helped them with it. Khrushchev has been photographed admiring a Czech ultra-centrifuge (used in medicine, chemistry and astronautics) which was claimed to be a great advance over American ultracentrifuges. Actually the Czech device appears to be an exact copy of an American invention described in the April 1961 Scientific American --with the difference that the Czech ultracentrifuge operates at 3.6 to 6 million RPM, the American at 90 to 120 million RPM. (Czechoslovakia and East Germany are suppliers of precision instruments and equipment to the whole bloc, although it appears from a recent article in a Czech technical journal that Czechoslovakia will not be permitted to develop large automatic digital computers; those will apparently be the special prerogative of the USSR.)

When a country claims to represent, in the world of science, the wave of the future, one would expect it to originate major new inventions and to be the first to put them to practical use. But the USSR has provided the world with virtually nothing new except the rocket, and even there its claim to originality can be disputed by Germany. It was not the USSR but the United Kingdom which first put atomic energy to practical peaceful use, building the first full-scale nuclear energy power plant at Calder Hall. Following pioneer work done in Hungary and Germany between the world wars, France has led the way in economical railroad electrification using alternating current at industrial frequency and ignitron locomotives. Ten years later, the Soviet Union is beginning to adopt the French system, after other countries such as Britain and Japan had recognized its superiority. Had the Soviets been able to make the shift at an earlier date, they would have saved themselves great costs, incurred through their persistence in using the obsolete 3000 volt D.C. system. Almost needless to say, discussions of this subject in the Soviet press do not mention the contribution made by France, Germany and Hungary, but give the impression that the new system was worked out in Soviet laboratories.

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Background: During his trip to South America to attend the conference of Punta del Este, Cuba's economic commissar Che Guevara attempted to give the impression that Communism did not exist in Cuba which merely had a form of socialist government and wished to resume its position as a member of the family of Latin American nations.

Guevara maintained that the Castro regime is committed not to export revolution to other American countries and wants to "coexist" with Latin America. Following a speech which Guevara made at Montevideo University, the National Government Council of Uruguay was obliged to issue a statement declaring that it was not proper for participants in international meetings to intervene in political affairs within the host country.

On another occasion, Guevara stated that Cuba had no intention of entering into a military arrangement with the Soviets and that Cuban-Soviet relations were strictly commercial.

The facts of the case, however, refute Guevara's claims:

1. In his speech on the situation in Brazil after President Quadros' resignation, Castro said:

"The militarists should know what a revolutionary guerrilla could mean in such a huge country as Brazil. If the Brazilian people take advantage of the Cuban example and start fighting in the mountains, the woods and the jungles, they will do all right. The Brazilians should remember what a few Cubans could do against a professional army. If the workers, the farmers, the students, the progressive elements and the honest soldiers take up arms and organize not one but a thousand battle fronts, the group of reactionary officers who have organized the coup can never beat the people!"
Such language is undisguised incitement to civil war.

2. On 6 September, a student arriving in Mexico from Cuba was found to be carrying subversive material and instructions for creating disturbances. Among the papers seized were instructions on guerrilla warfare tactics (which brings to mind Che Guevara's book on Guerrilla Warfare), the organization of youth militia, incitement to riot, the manufacture of homemade weapons and organization of subversive activities.

3. According to Captain Jorge Navarro, a freighter captain who fled from Cuba, an ammunition ship from a Soviet Satellite country docks virtually every day in Havana. The arms and ammunition are sent to other Cuban ports from whence they are ferried to various South American countries. What kind of export can this be if it not be of revolution?

4. The refusal of the Castro administration to recognize the right of the Cuban people to self-determination is clearly defined in repeated statements to the effect that elections are unnecessary and by giving the following spurious argument in defense of such a denial of popular rights. The Cuban radio stated that:

"even though the Cuban revolution is sure that it can win any kind of election in our country, it has carefully abstained from holding an election because it does not want to deceive our people and those in the rest of America by making them believe in the efficacy of this kind of representative democracy." Apparently "democracy" is all right so long as it is carefully prevented from being representative of the people.

5. A report issued by the Cuban Ministry of the Interior on 12 September points out "the intense counterrevolutionary activity of Archbishop Boza Masvidal (former rector of the University of Villa Nueva)" and says that he "has engaged in counterrevolutionary harangues, resorting to the well-known theme of anti-communism". It is impossible for a practicing Catholic not to be anti-communist. It would therefore appear that Castro's regime is proclaiming that all practicing Catholics per se are counter-revolutionaries and must therefore be eliminated.

6. The communique jointly issued by the Presidents of Cuba and of Czechoslovakia at the conclusion of President Dorticos' visit to Czechoslovakia in September gives a good illustration of what the Cuban leaders are referring to when they describe Cuba as a Socialist State. The communique states that

"the basic factor in determining the character of the present period of history is the existence and growth of the world socialist system. Its general development opens up prospects for unprecedented growth, prosperity and happiness to all mankind. The indefatigable efforts and highly principled policy of the Soviet Union and all the Socialist countries are a firm guarantee of freedom and independence and are a support for the endeavors and desires of all nations for peace."

It is doubtful that reference is made here to a country such as Sweden which has a truly socialist government.

7. On 26 July 1961, Fidel Castro announced the formation of a new monolithic single state party, the Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (ORI). Prior to this, the only political party to function as such was the Communist Party of Cuba, known as the People's Socialist Party (PSP). The latter is now integrated within the ORI and, although Castro is the Secretary General of the Party, Fabio Grobart, a Polish-born Cuban Communist with a long record of revolutionary activity in Latin America, was appointed "director" - no doubt meaning chief organizer - of the ORI. Although it might be said that Castro has

chosen to take over the Communist Party, experience teaches us that the Communists have never needed positions of formal leadership in a party to have effective control.

8. On 1 September 1961, the first number of a new theoretical magazine, Socialist Cuba, was published in Havana. The board of directors consists of the following: Fidel Castro; Oswaldo Dorticos, the President of Cuba; Blas Roca, Secretary General of the Cuban Communist Party; Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Executive Committee of the Cuban Communist Party; and Fabio Grobart (mentioned in paragraph 7 above), former Organizational Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and well known international communist figure who recently arrived in Cuba after spending a number of years in Prague and Moscow. A supplement of this first issue of the magazine consists of the complete text of the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The editorial, "Socialist Cuba", which is written by Castro, is followed by an article entitled "The Road to Socialism" by Blas Roca. In his editorial, Castro clearly outlines the transformation of the nationalist aspirations of the 26th July Movement into a movement to turn Cuba into a Soviet Communist Satellite. Referring to the Batista regime, he writes:

"Within a social regime of semicolonialism and capitalism such as that, there could not be another revolutionary change other than socialism, once the national liberation phase was ended."

He goes on to say:

"On 26 July 1961, the people supported the idea of organizing a United Party of the Socialist Revolution of Cuba. Socialist Cuba is another step. It is being published primarily for the revolutionary cadres and militants, for those who wish to develop ideologically and politically. The principal objectives of Socialist Cuba are: To examine, in the light of the scientific theory of Marxism, the different aspects of the struggle which the working class, with the support of the peasants and the other working groups, wages to attain socialism. To contribute to the ideological, political, theoretical and practical preparation of the cadres and militant revolutionaries. To make known in Cuba the experiences, problems and theoretical contributions of the fraternal movements of Latin America and of the world (This particular objective is fulfilled in this first issue by means of the following article: "The Principal Lessons of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party in Colombia" by A. Vasquez). Our magazine will have articles on problems relating to the principles and philosophy of scientific socialism."

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434. Rumors of a "War Party" in Moscow

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Khrushchev's terms to avoid something much worse.

Background: Stories appeared in the western press on 5 September and on succeeding days, arguing that Khrushchev is being compelled to demonstrate that he "is strong and not ready to 'appease' the West". In this connection, it has been suggested that "Stalinist" elements, led by Mikhail Suslov, and military leaders, led by Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, are the forces pushing for a "hard" policy, while Khrushchev himself would prefer a policy of "peaceful co-existence". In addition, the Chinese Communists, Ulbricht, the Czechs, and the Bulgarians are supposed to be pushing Khrushchev on. Marquis Childs has spread the story that there is a "Soviet Edward Teller" who has successfully pressed for a resumption of nuclear testing.

Some elements in this complex of speculation may have some validity, but the over-all picture is completely misleading. To begin with, these views reveal a complete misconception of the nature of "peaceful co-existence". It is probable that those westerners who believe that "peaceful co-existence" means peace and friendship in our sense have never read the Moscow Declaration of December 1960 or Khrushchev's comment on the Declaration of 6 January 1961. As these documents make plain, "peaceful co-existence" means that the west should renounce all resistance to Communist expansion, while "people's revolutions" and "wars of liberation" continue as before. Threats with bombs and rockets play an essential role in "peaceful co-existence"; it is largely these threats which are supposed to persuade the west to renounce self-defense.

In the second place, the views described display an ignorance of the way the Soviet government and its military forces are controlled. No one attains a high position in the Soviet Union (or any position worth mentioning) unless he has been approved for the appointment by the CPSU personnel organization under the Party Secretariat. All of the more recent appointments have been under the control of Khrushchev. It is true that during the fifties there were important rivals to Khrushchev in the party Presidium, men who had accumulated followings in earlier days, who had personal prestige, or who (as in Beria's case) dreamed of establishing a new foundation for power outside the party framework. But these rivals have been eliminated, the last to go being Marshal Zhukov, who was probably never a serious threat. Significantly, Beria was the first to fall, and he fell the hardest. Suslov has been a member of the party leadership since 1947; his survival is testimony to his flexibility. Far from seriously differing with Khrushchev, Suslov, an able manipulator of the dialectic, carried the ball for the Soviet leader in the prolonged, heated discussions which led to the Moscow Declaration. Malinovsky held a command in the Battle of Stalingrad, where Khrushchev was a political commissar; and in recent years, participation at Stalingrad with Khrushchev has been perhaps the most important consideration in deciding promotions in the higher ranks of the Red Army. Unlike his predecessor, Zhukov, Malinovsky has not, however, been given Presidium rank. It is interesting to note that Marshal Konev, recently recalled from retirement to command the Soviet forces in East Germany, has played a prominent role in

exaggerating Khrushchev's wartime services in the Ukraine. All in all, while Khrushchev listens to various advisers who sometimes present conflicting views, he now exercises complete control over the Soviet government and armed forces. He, and no one else, is responsible for the current world crisis.

The suggestions of pressure on Khrushchev do, admittedly, make more sense in a third regard: that there is pressure from outside the USSR, particularly from Peiping. Chinese pressure does not, however, lead Khrushchev to abandon "peaceful co-existence"; instead, it encourages him to try to demonstrate that "peaceful co-existence" can be used to break the will of the "imperialists". If Khrushchev does not make "peaceful co-existence" really deliver, he may lose the leadership of the world communist movement. But since Soviet subordination to Peiping is scarcely possible, the movement would split into Soviet and non-Soviet segments, rather than unite behind Mao. In any case, the argument between Khrushchev and Mao is, as far as concerns actual war or peace, somewhat artificial. Underneath the rhetoric, the basic difference between Mao's position and Khrushchev's is that Khrushchev already has the weapons. Strange as it may seem, this is by no means entirely an advantage to Khrushchev in the rivalry for control of the world movement. Like the advocates of unilateral disarmament at the other end of the scale, Mao can talk irresponsibly, boasting of the wars he would like to fight, and playing on revolutionary sentiment and personal ambition in underdeveloped countries, without being expected to show his steel. He knows by now that, so long as he merely talks, the U.S., not fearing his attack, will not attack him. But Khrushchev cannot adopt Mao's language; if he did his followers would ask why he didn't start the war at 0600 tomorrow morning, while the U.S. might conclude that the only reasonable course was to attack him first. In short, if Khrushchev fails, the alternative is not something worse; Mao is as yet unable to impose something worse. The alternative is an opportunity to achieve a peaceful world order.

It is indeed possible that some Soviet nuclear and military experts urged Khrushchev to undertake nuclear tests to eliminate any disparity between Soviet and U.S. capabilities. But their advice was, if at all, only one minor factor in Khrushchev's decision, and one can hardly doubt that a more important aim was the political one of conveying a nuclear threat, particularly to the assembled neutrals at Belgrade. It is from Belgrade that the stories of a "war party" have chiefly originated; Tito appears to have been using this explanation, not for the first time, to justify his adoption of a pro-Soviet position.

Finally, despite what has been said above, there are circumstances in which Khrushchev might lose control of Soviet policy. If he permits the crisis to deteriorate further, there is a danger that his military advisors may come to him, as happened in more than one country in July 1914, and tell him that it is imperative to take irreversible steps toward an attack, lest the other side attack first. Khrushchev has committed his prestige already, but a face-saving solution is still possible. It will not be possible to apply the brakes, once the Soviet military begin to fuel up their missiles.

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435. Final Declaration of the BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NONALIGNED NATIONS

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Background: From 1 to 6 September 1961, representatives of 25 nonaligned countries totaling one quarter of the UN member states and accounting for over one third of the world's population, met at a Nonaligned Conference in Belgrade Yugoslavia for the purpose of "exchanging views on international problems with a view to contributing more effectively to world peace and security. . . ." The delegations included Kings and Emperors, patriarchs and generals, as well as secular revolutionaries, each with his own grievances to air and the tendency to view international issues in the light of the immediate problems of his own country.

Nonalignment does not mean neutrality, as many of the Conference speakers were at pains to make clear, and most of the representatives were, in practice, heavily aligned on a number of important international issues. Colonialism aside, there was in fact little agreement on any major issue except in terms of the vaguest generalities, and almost no serious solutions were advanced. It seems that Mr. Nehru's doubts were well justified when he said "the fear creeps into my mind that we may not be able to get out of our rut, the rut of meeting together and passing long resolutions and making brave declarations and then going home and allowing the world to drift to disaster".

The Declaration is a compromise between the moderate elements, such as Nehru, U Nu and Nasser (in this case), who wished to restrict the communique to general recommendations, and the extremists who sought specific demands and condemnations. The vague language and juxtaposed statements speak plainly of unresolved issues and uneasy compromise. Thanks to Mr. Nehru and the moderates, many of the demands stemming from more limited views of national problems were omitted or couched in equivocal language. The call for complete disarmament was balanced by a reference to the need for strict controls, and while most delegates agreed that UN bodies should be reorganized to reflect the current membership, there was no support for Mr. Khrushchev's "troika" formula. Aside from a general plea to abjure force in Berlin, no common area of agreement was found, nor was there any acceptance of the Soviet plan for a peace treaty which had been promoted by Nkrumah.

Reaction to the Conference in some Western circles has ranged from surprise and dismay to outright anger -- particularly at the failure of the Declaration to condemn in explicit terms the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear testing; but many officials of the nonaligned world have voiced approval of Conference statements. One of the most unfortunate concomitants of the developing countries' anti-colonial obsession is their willingness to condemn the slightest vestige of classical Western colonialism, while appearing to remain unmoved by the most blatant forms of interference and intimidation practiced by the USSR over its immediate neighbors.

This much appears certain: Bandung and Belgrade are only the beginning of what will be an extended effort of the nonaligned nations to find a common ground, to exert an influence on the great powers, and to obtain for themselves a larger voice in the solution of world affairs. As Nehru put it:

"....Some few years ago...this business of non-alignment was a rare phenomenon. A few countries here and there talked about it, and other countries rather made fun of them, or at any rate did not take them seriously. 'What is meant by non-alignment? You must be on this or that side.' That was the argument. Well that argument is dead today. Nobody dares say that, because the whole course of history in the last few years has shown the growing influence, the spread of the conception of non-alignment."

In recognition of this growing influence President Kennedy made an effort to associate the US with the basic aims of the nonaligned nations in his message to the Belgrade Conference, as follows:

"We believe that the peoples represented at this conference are committed to a world society in which men have the right and freedom to determine their own destiny, a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other and in which the powerful do not devour the weak.... The American people share that commitment."

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR

TO THE EDITOR:

(Several months ago a request was received from Anatoly S. Raben, M.D., B.Sc., chief, editorial staff, Department of International Scientific Relations, Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, to publish the review of a publication by Julian Hoptman which appears below. While it is not the usual policy of this Journal to publish reviews that have appeared elsewhere, the editors feel that the intrinsic interest of the material warranted a deviation from our usual policy. The review was also submitted to the author and his reply follows.)

CPYRGHT

THE DISTORTING MIRROR

BRUCELLOSIS IN THE USSR—A review of the literature—By Julian Hoptman. Public Health Service Publ. No. 635. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, 1959.

As stated in the Preface, the author has made an attempt to assess the investigations into the problem of brucellosis carried out in the USSR. The author based his review on the Soviet literature on the subject and interspaced it with personal remarks. The author complains, as early as the Preface, of the lack of information on this problem in the Soviet literature hoping, however, that the review will be helpful to the American investigators in introducing to them the hitherto unknown literature. It will be noted that the author complains of the "low standard of data analysis published in professional journals" (p. III), thus hastening to express his far-from-objective opinion. Pursuing his biased opinion, the author asserts in the Introduction that human and animal brucellosis is one of the most serious problems facing organs of health protection in the USSR, being consequently, a crucial economic issue (p. IX).

In the chapter on the epidemiology of brucellosis Dr. Hoptman, while analyzing individual works on the incidence of brucellosis among different occupational groups in single foci, applies,

then, these data to the whole of the USSR population and draws the first of his sensational conclusions to the effect that about three million cases of brucellosis are registered in the USSR, and that annually about one-third of the shepherds are afflicted with the disease, the absenteeism among them ranging from one to four weeks; if taken as a whole, 1.3 per cent of the population are infected with brucellosis (p. 5).

A series of tables provides a more detailed analysis. In Table 2 one can see, for example, that the annual incidence of brucellosis in the USSR in the years 1938-1940 was 6,944,000 cases, dropping down to 3,690,000-4,920,000 cases in 1948 and down to 2,480,000-3,308,000 cases between 1953 and 1955. It is but natural that the number of infected animals is expressed in terms of millions which causes "heavy economic losses among animals due to brucellosis melitensis" (p. 5).

An extremely original method of evaluating facts, indeed! If used as the basis, it will suffice to determine the incidence of the disease in some of the foci and the index thus obtained can then be multiplied by the country's whole population, and, hey presto! you get the number of cases for the whole of the country. The use of this "original" method would make superfluous the collection of statistical data on polio in the USA. Pursuing this "method" it would be quite in order to take the 1956 outbreak of polio in Detroit, the

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incidence of which reached the figure of 60 cases per 100,000 of the population, so as to decide that the country's incidence of polio was 100,805 cases. That the real figure was 15,140 is immaterial.

We have to disappoint Julian Hoptman. The real state of affairs regarding brucellosis in the USSR is not so tragic. As is evident from an official report of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, the incidence of brucellosis in the USSR during the last decade was expressed by the following tabulation.

Year	Number of Cases (Fresh Ones)	Per 100,000 of the Population
1950	12,443	6.8
1951	12,089	6.5
1952	14,027	7.4
1953	11,215	5.8
1954	10,003	5.1
1955	8,120	4.1
1956	8,234	4.1
1957	5,957	2.9
1958	5,686	2.7
1959	4,645	2.1

Evidently the author was misled by the alarming tone of some of the articles and the wide scope of scientific research on brucellosis in the USSR. But that which is quite clear to the Soviet reader may be a riddle to Dr. Hoptman. We are seriously concerned with 5,000 brucellosis patients since to the Soviet doctors they are not just mere "cases," but suffering human beings, and the Soviet State does not spare "time, money, and scientific research"—which Hoptman attempts so ardently to count in his introduction to the review—so as to prevent even these few cases of the disease. Due to the wide scientific research activities and hard work on the part of the practical health workers it became possible to pose the task of wiping out brucellosis in the country as a whole. Soviet literature contains quite

a few works on tularemia, although the most scrupulous analysis shows that the country with a population of 210 million people had less than 1,000 cases of tularemia in the whole of its vast territory in 1959. The scientific research laboratories of the country are busily engaged in wide research on the specific prophylaxis of anthrax although the incidence of this disease does not exceed 1,000 cases per year. The problem of eradicating visceral leishmaniasis is subject to serious and heated discussion by scientists, although the country's incidence of this disease does not amount to more than several scores of cases annually.

After analyzing the sources of infection with the *Brucella* of different types the author found a new and permanent problem in the USSR—infection during contact with laboratory cultures of the *Brucella* (p. 11). Kumys (!) in Dr. Hoptman's opinion is also one of the factors instrumental in transmitting brucellosis, although a less frequent one than fresh milk.

The material on the possible natural reservoirs of brucellosis is presented more objectively and solidly. The chapters devoted to the clinical picture of the disease, which incidentally are very brief, quote predominantly old data pertaining to the end of the 40's and beginning of the 50's.

A considerable number of newer and more modern investigations of Soviet authors have been omitted from the review altogether. This is especially true of the works by the Kazakh clinicians (N.D. Beklemishev, and others) who introduced many new and important factors into the understanding of the clinical picture of brucellosis. The works of Soviet authors on the laboratory diagnostics of brucellosis were subjected to a detailed analysis by the author. Also shown in great detail is the use of live vaccine for the prophylaxis of brucellosis in the USSR. And yet, even in

rendering these works which won world-wide recognition, Dr. Hoptman could not help showing his scepticism (the efficiency indexes invariably appear in quotes in his review) and also his doubts as to the quality of the drugs produced (p. 56).

The brochure on the whole is a failure. The biased opinion prevented the author from passing fair judgment on the self-evident achievements of Soviet science in the field of brucellosis research and the success of the Soviet Public Health in effecting its prophylaxis. This is why the review distorts the picture of tackling the problem of brucellosis in the USSR although it summarizes rather bulky material published in the Soviet literature on the subject. If the author allows us to use his own words we might say that "the low standard of data analysis" and the prejudiced opinion prevented Dr. Hoptman from writing a book which is so needed by American physicians.

Professor Victor M. Zhdanov, chief scientific secretary
Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences, USSR

REPLY

It is regrettable that the author of the review, entitled, "The Distorting Mirror," derived so little satisfaction from "Brucellosis in the USSR," Public Health Service Publ. No. 635, 1959. The following discussion may help to clarify the issues under consideration.

The Matter of Critical Evaluation

The Preface of this monograph is neither a "complaint" nor an indictment of Soviet medical research and practice. It does intend to convey the limitations and imperfections which were encountered in the review of a large body of foreign literature. The

wide availability of translated journal sources now makes it an easy matter to determine if the limitations of Soviet medical literature, as outlined in the Preface of the monograph, were objectively presented. These include: insufficient basic information pertinent to evaluation of morbidity and assessment of vaccine efficacy; a paucity of necessary raw study data; frequently overdrawn conclusions; and the superficial character and nonspecific documentation of publications. An example of recognition and attempted improvement of some of these problems may be cited here. In a report (1958) on "The Results of Checking the Work of the Journal and Measures to Improve It," the editorial staff and editorial advisory board of *Zhurnal Mikrobiologii, Epidemiologii i Immunobiologii* strongly emphasized the need for improving the quality of articles and raising the standards demanded of authors and reviewers.*

The Soviet review further attempts to cast doubt as to the statement made in the introduction to the monograph to the effect that, "Brucellosis of man and animals is considered one of the most serious health problems in the USSR . . ." and has caused major economic problems. This viewpoint of Soviet investigators can be documented by specific quotations from the medical and agricultural literature of the USSR.

1954

"Brucellosis causes great economic losses to farms of animal husbandry; therefore the eradication of brucellosis is of great importance to the national economy."

"The fight against brucellosis is of greatest national significance." Volkov, I. V. Brucellosis in Agricultural Animals, 1954. 31 pp.

1955

"In spite of the fact that considerable success has been achieved in the fight against brucellosis in agricultural animals, this disease still causes great economic losses to the ani-

* See Zhur. Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol. 29,9:157-159, 1958.

mal industry." Muromtsev, S. M., and Dobrokhotoy, A. M. (editors). *Brucellosis in Agricultural Animals*. Moscow, 1955. 303 pp. 1957-1958

"... the incidence of brucellosis has been lowered to a considerable degree; nevertheless, the fight against this disease remains one of the most important and topical tasks which the Soviet Health Service has to face." Gudoshnik, A. N. Zhur. *Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol.* 29,8:113-117, 1958.

1958

"Elimination of the widespread incidence of brucellosis is one of the urgent problems the Soviet Health Service has to solve." Abashidze, T. G. *Ibid.* 29,1:114-119, 1958.

"Brucellosis is one of the diseases which do great economic damage to the livestock industry and frequently cause illness among human beings." Studentsov, K. P. *Ibid.* 29, 8:133-135, 1958.

1957-1960

"Among Q-fever, tularemia, leptospiroses, brucellosis and others (sic zoonoses) brucellosis occupies first place in extent of damage it causes to the population and economy." Karakulov, I. K. *Ibid.* 28,10:11-14, 1957.

"Zoonoses comprise half of all infectious diseases of humans in the USSR." Smirnov, S. M. *Medit. Rabot.* (Feb. 26), 1960, p. 4.

The major sources of infection which contribute to this brucellosis disease problem have been clearly documented in the monograph. Minor and ancillary sources were also specifically referenced with Soviet literature. Discussion of the role of laboratory infections and the consumption of acidophilic milk products was based entirely upon the views of Soviet investigators.

The Matter of Morbidity in the USSR

The minimum of basic statistical data available from the USSR makes estimates of the morbidity of brucellosis speculative, at best. This is clearly brought out on pages three and four of the monograph, which state:

"... these estimates are highly speculative and the Soviet data may be unreliable, as evidenced by variable diagnostic criteria, inadequate reporting and infrequent publication of raw statistical information."

In contrast to the statements made in the Soviet review, "incidence" per year of new cases was not estimated in the monograph. Only the possible prevalence of melitensis type cases for particular time periods was estimated. The average per cent of the population of all endemic areas in the USSR which had the disease was derived from Soviet literature. These rates were applied against the estimated total number of persons in contact with sheep and goats in endemic areas. The rate used for the period before 1940 is consistent with the unchanged or increased number of cases per year in the 1934-1940 period, as reported by Soviet authors.*

A strong element of doubt was noted every time these crude estimates were used to explore the extent of brucellosis cases in the USSR and the need for more reliable information was expressed in the very first paragraph of the monograph preface.

What then is the extent of brucellosis in the USSR? The 1950-1959 new case incidence as given in the Soviet review is not fully indicative, although public release of even this information on numbers of cases is unprecedented with respect to Soviet literature on brucellosis. The table does not indicate what proportion of these cases are of the melitensis, abortus or suis type of disease. It neither indicates the attack rate for the population of the endemic areas which are primarily concerned with the disease, nor does it give the precise criteria used for diagnosis of these cases. Since the Soviet literature emphasizes that the melitensis type of disease is the foremost brucellosis problem in man in the USSR, many of the cases cited each year for the ten year period have a prolonged clinical course and a high rate of

* Zdrodovskiy, P. F. *Brucellosis*. Medgiz, Moscow, 1953. Smirnov, S. *Medit. Rabot.* Vol. 19, No. 32, 1956. Smirnov, S. Zhur. *Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol.* 29,11:4-12, 1958. Ver-shilova, P. A. *Ibid.* 27, 10:53-57, 1956.

chronicity and relapse even after therapy. According to Soviet authors, 45 per cent to 75 per cent of melitensis cases in endemic areas of the USSR apparently become chronic.* Therefore the number of cases of melitensis type brucellosis which required medical care for any year between 1950 and 1959 should include the new case incidence, in addition to the significant number of chronic cases which are carried over from previous years, as well as the reported 2.5 per cent to 6 per cent reinfections.†

Thus, statements about the "true state of affairs," as referred to in Dr. Zhdanov's review, must also answer the question of how many people are suffering from brucellosis in the USSR. Furthermore, it is of critical importance when discussing the economic and epidemiological aspects of brucellosis to consider how many livestock are diseased in proportion to the total holdings, in terms of absolute numbers. The almost exclusive use in Soviet literature of relative percentage indexes of morbidity for man and animals, which refer to unrevealed base year figures, is misleading.

Soviet publications make it clear that the USSR has made progress in reduction of the incidence of brucellosis and other infectious diseases in man. However, claims based on obscure and conflicting data only serve to detract from the effort which went into such progress. For example, Dr. Zhdanov claims that the incidence of anthrax in man now does not exceed 1,000 cases per year in the USSR. Yet how is this statement to be reconciled with other statements in the

* Zdrodovskiy, P. F. Brucellosis. Moscow, Medgiz, 1953. Rudnev, G. P. Biomitsin. Moscow, 1954, pp. 53-54. Ochkur, P. P. Pathological Morphology of Brucellosis in Man, 1951. Bogdanov, I. L. Sovet. med. 19, 1:20-27, 1955. Ochkur, P. P. Arkh. Patol. Vol. 11, No. 1, 1949. Katsenovich, A. L. Klin. med. 32,3:42-47, 1954. Blagodarnyy, Ya. A. Vestnik. Akad. Nauk Kazak. February, 1956. Smirnov, S. M. Zhur. Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol. 29,11:4-12, 1958.

† See Vershileva, P. A. Zhur. Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol. 29,3:58-62, 1958.

Soviet literature (1950) that anthrax had been eliminated from the USSR, ten years ago?

"... Such terrible diseases as rinderpest, epidemic inflammation of the lungs and ANTHRAX, have been LIQUIDATED in the Soviet Union by the efforts of veterinary workers; the morbidity in other diseases has been sharply reduced." (Koropov, V., and Borisovich, F. Veterinary Encyclopedic Dictionary. Vol. 1, 1950, pp. 130-133.

Furthermore, this quotation is incompatible with the statement in a later article that,

"The incidence of brucellosis in man before the introduction of vaccination (sic before 1952) either increased or remained at a high level, showing no tendency to decrease."

Similarly, a table in the same article by S. M. Smirnov clearly demonstrates that, up to 1956, the national incidence of brucellosis in cattle was consistently well above the 1949 index and the incidence in sheep and goats had risen by 230 per cent.*

The evident need for better reporting, collating, and publishing of basic statistical information on infectious diseases in the USSR is well recognized by Soviet public health workers.

"The extensive data which accumulate in public health centers as a result of compulsory notification of infectious diseases are little used in scientific work..." Yelkin, I. I. Zhur. Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol. 28,11:3-11, 1957.

Indeed the entire issue of Sovetskaya Zdravookhraneniye (Soviet Public Health 19,10:1-65, 1960) is devoted to the need for improvement in reporting and use of public health statistics in the USSR.

The Matter of Claims versus Proofs

Unquestionably, there exists a major effort in the USSR which is pointed

* See Smirnov, S. M. Zhur. Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol. 29,11:4-12, 1958.

toward the problem of brucellosis in man and animals and which is now showing some tangible results. Furthermore, Soviet investigations do have a contributory bearing on studies and programs carried out in other nations. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the research, methods, or domestic accomplishments of Soviet public health workers preempt the efforts of their counterparts in other major countries of the world. This generalization applies to the literature surveyed in the monograph and also is consistent with more current publications. As aptly stated by the editorial staff and advisory board of a major Soviet medical journal,

"... the lack of references may result in too many original discoveries springing up. . . ."
Zhur. Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol. 29, 9:157-159, 1958.

The mass inoculation of millions of people in endemic areas of the USSR, with a live BAI-19 strain, certainly is a bold move which requires strong proofs of vaccine safety and efficacy. Soviet data have not refuted the accumulating reports that human sickness is caused by this strain. The decision to use live vaccine in man (1952) apparently was prompted by increasing foci of infection and human incidence in the face of inadequate veterinary and sanitary hygiene measures. At present, three strains (BAI-19, a strain 19 derivative and an M strain) are used in the USSR for immunizing people. A sharp decline in human incidence has been attributed largely to this vaccination program, despite the fact that veterinary control measures often have not been well implemented, particularly in sheep-goat foci of *Brucella melitensis* infection. If true, this would indeed be a significant public health advance. But

one must entertain some reservations about such claims until sufficient original data are available concerning possible untoward reactions, vaccination infections, and information on precise protection from the vaccine as indicated by well controlled field trials. Detailed information is lacking on the nature of local and generalized postvaccination reactions in man. Incidence among vaccinated persons apparently is less than among nonvaccinated persons but ranges from 0.5 per cent to 8.0 per cent, depending upon extent of exposure to the infection. Furthermore, mass vaccination of populations followed by observation of incidence from year to year is best preceded by incontestable, well controlled field research. The true value of mass inoculation with live brucellosis vaccine, especially in areas where necessary antiepidemiological and sanitary-hygiene reforms apparently are not fully operative, is still to be determined.*

In summary, the monograph "Brucellosis in the USSR" (1959) was an attempt to evaluate the qualitatively variable but abundant Soviet literature on brucellosis. Facts and claims were derived from the publications of Soviet authors. The encouraging response to this monograph from investigators and practitioners in the United States, indicates that it is indeed serving a useful purpose.

Julian Hoptman, Research Associate,
Department of Microbiology and
Community Health, The George Washington University School of Medicine,
Washington, D. C.

* Vershilova, P. A. Zhur. Mikrobiol. Epid. i Immunobiol. 29,3:58-62, 1958. Khodzhaev, Sh. Ibid. 29,9:97-99, 1958. Smirnov, S. M. Ibid. 29,11:4-12, 1958. Shmutter, M. F., et al. Ibid. 31,6:12-16, 1960.

Science and Politics in the Soviet Union

Political advancement is usually won in the Soviet Union by those who are most assiduous in identifying themselves with communist orthodoxy. Members of the Soviet intelligentsia face the temptation to advance their intellectual or scientific status by the same means. Lysenko is of course the outstanding example of Soviet scientific careerism. Indeed, we should recognize that such frankly political scientists as he have not emerged in other fields; biology is more "political" than other sciences because of its relation to the human being and to agriculture, always the weak spot of the Soviet economy. But Lysenko's 8 August 1961 appointment as President of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences reflects the continuing effect of ideology on Soviet science. Khrushchev, a complete politician and philistine, has often favored Lysenko, the "practical scientist," and Khrushchev's reforms of Soviet education are designed to produce scientists who, like Lysenko, are not "divorced from life."

Using the published record of the December 1958 CPSU plenum, Robert Conquest has described (Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R., pp. 370-371) an incident illustrating Khrushchev's approach to science:

In April 1956 Lysenko had resigned as President of the Agricultural Academy, probably as part of the post Congress liberalization. The great biologist, Nikolai Vavilov, his predecessor in the post, who had died in an Arctic camp in 1943 as a result of opposing the new biology, was rehabilitated at that time.

But Khrushchev supported Lysenko in 1957, and in December 1958 the Soviet leader went further:

Now he spoke up more strongly--not a vote in a controversy, but a suppression of one side of it. When, at the plenum itself, I. D. Mustafaev attacked the Botanical Journal Khrushchev commented:

'The cadres must be looked at. Evidently people were selected for the editorship who are opposed to Michurinist science. /Lysenko's ideas were supposedly originated by Michurin/ While they remain, nothing will change. They must be changed and others put in--real Michurinists. Here lies the basic solution to the question.'

Mustafaev: 'Nikita Sergeyevich, not only this journal has such a tone. Sometimes scientist-Communists cannot think of how to behave. Not long ago ill rumors reached me that our delegation to China, among whom there were some biologists, declared that Comrade Lysenko was finished now, not only in theory but also in fact.'

Khrushchev: 'It was Tsitsin who said that' (Stenographic Record)

(N. V. Tsitsin is a prominent expert on plant reproduction and an old opponent of Lysenko's.)

If biology has been affected most by ideology, other sciences have also been influenced. Voprosy filosofii (Problems of Philosophy) has stated editorially, "For its fruitful and healthy development, science requires equipment consisting not merely of material means--laboratories, experimental installations, instruments, etc., but also an equipment of ideas that will guide the thinking of scientists along the correct path." This "equipment of ideas" is of course Marxism-Leninism, and it is supposed to be needed in all science. In recent years (since Stalin's death) there have been doctrinal discussions in connection with quantum physics, the theory of relativity, and cosmology. What is objectionable from an intellectual standpoint is not the fact that Soviet scientists question the ideas of such

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(Cont.)

western theorists as Niel Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Ernst Mach, or Einstein --all scientific ideas are subject to criticism on grounds of logic or fact--but the tendency of Soviet scientists to test the theories of these men by their compatibility with the dogma of dialectical materialism. Even if a Soviet scientist defends such theories, he does so by arguing that they can be reconciled with Marxism-Leninism. Conceivably, dialectical materialism might contribute to science and vice versa. But instead of attempting to create a balance between valid parts of Marxism and valid scientific ideas (instead, one might say, of regarding Marxism and science dialectically), Marxism-Leninism is considered an absolute, and by definition "science" agrees with it. If a hypothesis disagrees with Marxism-Leninism, it is not scientific. (Illogically, however, scientific results which appear to confirm Marxism-Leninism are welcomed.) But contrast, to western minds, science is itself not an absolute; it is a method of searching for truth, on the principles that scientific hypotheses are those which are internally consistent and compatible with verified facts. In keeping with these principles, science requires public discussion and public verification.

In Daedalus (Summer 1960, p. 579), David Joravsky offered the hypothesis that Lysenko's continuing importance was due to the chronic agricultural crisis, in which he had at least stirred the experts up and won the peasants over to the idea of trying to improve agriculture. Joravsky then says:

The most serious objection to this hypothesis is that the practical success of "Michurinism" could not have won agriculturists and Party chiefs to support Lysenko, since these practical successes have been incorrectly explained, vastly overrated, or altogether illusory. Though serious, this objection is not unanswerable. As long as Lysenko's opponents have been unable to consign all his claims to the third category, he has had ground for rebuttal. Moreover, as the point was reached where nearly every seedman or stockbreeder, when offering an improved variety, did so in the name of "Michurinism" and in defiance of the geneticists, it became impossible for the latter to claim practical successes for themselves.

In describing Lysenko's tactics, Joravsky is in fact making a classic description of communist politics in action. If we make some substitutions, such as "socialism" for "Michurinism," "Khrushchev" for "Lysenko," "Neutrals" for "agriculturists and Party chiefs," "underdeveloped nation" for "seedman or stockbreeder" and "United States" for "geneticists," we will have a fair description of the world situation which Khrushchev is trying to develop. In biology as in politics, the Communists use the big lie.

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ATTACHMENT to Item #435

PRESIDENT SENDS NOTE TO NEUTRALSNew York Times, 31 August 1961Message to Belgrade Talks Cites Common Interest in Peace and Freedom

By Tom Wicker

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President Kennedy said today that the nonaligned nations that will open a conference at Belgrade Friday shared with the United States a commitment to "a world at peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and economic systems."

Mr. Kennedy's remarks at his news conference appeared to be an effort to identify the United States with the basic interest of the nonaligned nations.

He carefully avoided, however, any effort to influence them on specific issues such as Berlin.

Instead, Mr. Kennedy said he was sending a message to the conference that included the following passage:

"We believe that the peoples represented at this conference are committed to a world society in which men have the right and freedom to determine their own destiny, a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other and in which the powerful do not devour the weak.

"The American people share that commitment. We have pledged the influence of this nation to the abolition of exploitation in all its forms."

This was viewed here as a tacit appeal for the conference to take a strong stand on national self-determination and an effort to associate the United States with that position in advance.

The President opened his message to the meeting by declaring that "it is always encouraging when responsible world leaders join together to consider the problems that beset mankind."

He conceded that "most of the countries at Belgrade do not consider themselves committed on certain of the issues which confront us today." Then Mr. Kennedy set forth a catalogue of "commitments" that he said they did have, and which the United States shared.

The first of these was a commitment to the Charter of the United Nations. The next was a commitment to "finding a way to halt the waste of the earth's resources in the building of the implements of death and destruction."

Finally, Mr. Kennedy said, "the peoples represented at Belgrade are committed to achieving a world at peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and economic systems, and to live their own way of life, and since our earliest beginnings, this nation has shared that commitment."

These things "and much more," the President said, "the leaders of Belgrade have in common. This and much more the people of the United States have in common with them."

"So for myself and I am sure for the American people, I express the hope that their deliberations there will bring us all nearer these goals."

Mr. Kennedy's letter to the conference thus reflected the hope in informed quarters here that the uncommitted leaders would take positions the United States could share on "issues involving all of mankind."

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